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PREVENTING SUCCESSOR LIABILITY FOR
DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS: SAFEGUARDS
FOR ACQUIRING CORPORATIONS
JOHN P. ARNESS*
L. ANTHONY SUTIN**
and TERESA C. PLOTKIN***
In recent years, many courts have determined longstanding limitations
on successor liability to be insufficiently sensitive to the compensation
needs of products liability claimants. In response, courts in several juris-
dictions have eroded traditional corporate law immunities to successor
liability for defective products. Although this liberalization of the princi-
ples of successor liability has expanded the range of potential defendants
in many tort lawsuits, the expansion of liability has caused an increase in
uncertainty in corporate transactions, and an increase in complex legal
and logistical maneuvering to avoid the growing liability web. This Arti-
cle seeks to outline the expansion of successor liability in the products
area, note the negative implications of that expansion, and identify mech-
anisms to prevent the attachment of successor liability under both the
traditional and expanded regimes. The Article also prescribes a statutory
alternative to create much needed stability and certainty in this area
through a straightforward allocation of liabilities between purchasers and
sellers. I
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Harvard University, 1949. Mr. Arness is engaged in trial practice involving product liability, anti-
trust, corporate, personal injury, and insurance coverage litigation. He is a Fellow of the American
College of Trial Lawyers (member of the Board of Regents, 1984-1988), the International Academy
of Trial Lawyers, the International Society of Barristers and serves as Chairman, Board of Trustees,
National Institute for Trial Advocacy.
** Associate, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C. J.D., Harvard University, 1984; B.A.,
Brandeis University, 1981.
*** Associate, Hogan & Hartson, Washington, D.C. J.D., Harvard University, 1987; B.A.,
Bowdoin College, 1980.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors and do not represent the posi-
tion of Hogan & Hartson or any of its clients.
1. This Article does not undertake to evaluate the success in accomplishing compensatory
goals that changes in the common law of successor liability have achieved, a task that has been
extensively undertaken by others. See Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Corporation
Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 907 n.1 (1983).
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I. BACKGROUND
Under longstanding principles of corporate law, a corporation
purchasing the assets of another corporation is not responsible for the
debts or liabilities of the acquired corporation.2 This rule, strictly a crea-
ture of corporate law, evolved as a protection for the rights of commer-
cial creditors and dissenting shareholders. Over the years it has
provided corporate successors a measure of security from unknown or
contingent liabilities engendered by predecessors.4 Application of the
rule has also added stability to the corporate acquisition process by pro-
viding a clear guideline under which the parties to an acquisition could
operate with predictability.
Most jurisdictions traditionally qualify the general rule of nonliability
with four exceptions. Under these exceptions, liabilities will transfer in
an asset acquisition when: (1) the purchaser expressly or implicitly
agrees to assume the liabilities of the seller; (2) the transaction amounts
to a consolidation or merger; (3) the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the transferor corporation; or (4) the transaction is en-
tered into to defraud creditors, or otherwise escape liability.'
2. See 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7122 at
188 (rev. perm. ed. 1980). The justification for this rule lies in that it "accords with the fundamental
principle of justice and fairness, under which the law imposes responsibility for one's own acts and
not for the totally independent acts of others." Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th
Cir. 1977). Additional justifications have been found in the bona fide purchaser doctrine. A corpo-
ration purchasing another corporation's assets is basically a purchaser of property and, under the
bona fide purchaser doctrine, the purchaser who gives adequate consideration and who has no
knowledge of any claims against an item purchased, takes that item free of those claims. Note,
Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the Product User and the Small Manufac-
turer Through Increased Availability of Products Liability Insurance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000,
1005-06 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Products Liability]. See also Note, Products Liability of Successor
Corporations: A Policy Analysis, 58 IND. L.J. 677, 683-85 (1983-84) [hereinafter Note, Successor
Corporations].
3. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 340-43, 431 A.2d 811, 815-16 (N.J. 1981).
4. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Ortiz v. South
Bend Lathe, 46 Cal. App. 3d 842, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1975); Schwarz v. McGraw Edison, 14 Cal.
App. 3d 767, 92 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1971).
5. See, e.g., Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986); Santa Maria v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1986); Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D.
Ark. 1988); In re Asbestos Litigation (Bell), 517 A.2d 697, 699 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986); Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Canron, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 823, 373 N.E.2d 364, (1977); AMERICAN LAW
OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d § 7:1 n.4 (1988).
A fifth exception, occasionally cited by courts, allows for a transfer of liabilities when a transfer of
assets is made without adequate consideration and provision is not made for creditors of the trans-
feror. See Daweiko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa. Super. 15, 18, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).
There is some division in the federal courts in Maryland as to the acceptance of the four primary
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Application of the traditional corporate law rule to products liability
plaintiffs has given rise to numerous instances of perceived inequity. For
example, injured plaintiffs have been left without a remedy in situations
where the manufacturer of a product causing injury has dissolved and
the current holder of the manufacturing assets did not assume tort liabili-
ties. As one court adhering to the principle of nonliability observed:
Plaintiff's counsel argues eloquently and, to me, convincingly that as a
matter of social policy, the right of a person injured by a defective product
to recover from the manufacturing company should not turn on the subse-
quent history of that company, especially when the company, though under
new ownership, is still extant in the eyes of the public and is still enjoying
the benefits of its name and its good will. This argument, however, is di-
rected to the wrong forum. My function is to follow the rule which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court would probably follow. 6
Today, due to the longevity of products, the long latency period for
many diseases, and the fast pace of corporate evolution, the chances are
decreasing that an original manufacturer will be still in existence when a
plaintiff is injured.7 With the advent of strict tort liability as a mecha-
nism for assigning liability in the absence of fault,8 some jurisdictions
now have expanded the scope of the successor liability doctrine, enlarg-
ing the circumstances under which purchasing corporations may be
deemed "successors" for purposes of fixing liability.9 The first such ex-
common law exceptions. Compare Giraldi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 687 F. Supp. 987, 991 (D. Md.
1988) (applying the four exceptions) with Smith v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 687 F. Supp. 201,
204 (D. Md. 1988) (rejecting the four exceptions, noting that successor liability is imposed when
"the equities are sufficiently strong").
In addition, numerous state statutes recognize the assumption of tort liability by a successor cor-
poration after a statutory merger or consolidation. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-076(B)(5)
(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 11.50(5) (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-14-6(E)
(1983); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06(A)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
6. Bazan v. Kux Machine Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973). See also Turner v.
Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 419, 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1976) (from the perspective of
the claimant, "distinctions between the types of corporate transfers are wholly unmeaningful"); Ra-
mirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 341-42, 431 A.2d 811, 816 (1981) (traditional rule "places
unwarranted emphasis on the form rather than the practical effect of a particular corporate transac-
tion" and is "inconsistent with the [rapidly] developing principles of strict liability [in tort] and
unresponsive to the [legitimate] interests of persons injured by defective products in the stream of
commerce").
7. See Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Lia-
bilitv Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 17, 17-18 (1986).
8. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701, (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
9. Several jurisdictions have expanded the scope of successor liability by imposing liability
based upon a successor's failure to warn customers of defects in the predecessor's products that were
19891
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pansion was marked by the Michigan Supreme Court in Turner v. Bitu-
minous Casualty Co., which established a "continuity of enterprise"
exception to the traditional nonliability rule for successor corporations. 10
Under the framework of this exception, the court deemed it appropriate
to attach liability to a purchasing corporation when:
(1) the acquiring corporation retains the predecessor's key person-
nel, production facilities, and general business operation;
(2) the seller dissolves following the acquisition;
(3) the purchaser assumes the seller's liabilities and obligations
necessary to continue its normal operation; and
(4) the purchaser holds itself out to the world as the continuation
of the seller.1
Thus, the "continuing enterprise" exception embraces transactions that,
in outward appearance, yield an ongoing and identical business
operation.
Another judicially created exception that has evolved is the "product
line" exception. The leading case adopting this exception is Ray v. Alad
Corp., 12 in which the California Supreme Court held that "a party which
acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line of
products assumes strict tort liability for defects in units of the same prod-
uct line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity from
which the business was acquired."1 " In Ray the plaintiff fell from a de-
fective ladder manufactured by a company that had sold its assets and
dissolved six months prior to the accident. The successor that acquired
all the manufacturing assets of the original company had continued to
manufacture the same line of ladders, using the same name, equipment,
designs, and personnel. 14 The successor also solicited customers through
the same sales force without any outward acknowledgement of the
discovered, or should have been discovered, by the successor. This duty is based on a purchaser's
assumption of the predecessor's duty to repair or service its products. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Lakewood
Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Application of this duty turns on post-
transaction behavior by the seller and is beyond the scope of an article addressing transaction-based
concerns.
10. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). The continuity of enterprise approach was also
followed in Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Co., 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law),
Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Ala. 1983), and Radzuil v. Hooper, Inc., 125 Misc. 2d
362, 479 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
11. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 430, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 (1976).
12. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P,2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
13. Id. at 34, 560 P.2d at 11, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
14. Id. at 24-25, 560 P.2d at 5, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 576.
[Vol. 67:353
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change in ownership."5
In a suit against the successor, the trial court found that the successor
corporation was not liable for the torts of the original manufacturer
under traditional corporate rules governing successor liability. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court reversed, however, holding the successor corpora-
tion liable for the plaintiff's injuries. Contemplating the social policies
underlying strict products liability,16 the court decided that traditional
corporate rules did not adequately protect the policy goals of strict prod-
ucts liability. Therefore, the court created a "product line" exception to
the traditional doctrine of successor liability. The court justified its ex-
tension of liability to the purchasing entity by noting: (1) the virtual de-
struction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer as
a result of its acquisition by the successor; (2) the successor's ability to
assume the original manufacturer's risk spreading role; and (3) the fair-
ness of requiring the successor to assume its predecessor's liabilities given
that the successor was enjoying the benefits of the original manufac-
turer's goodwill.' 7
15. Id.
16. The court concluded that the paramount policies to be promoted by strict tort liability are
protecting otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and spreading through society
compensatory costs for them. Id. at 31, 560 P.2d at 8, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
17. 1d. at 33-34, 560 P.2d at 9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 580. Several jurisdictions have followed the
product line exception. See Hickman v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Colo.
1984); Amader v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1982); State of Maryland
v. Keene Corp., Civ. Action No. 1108600 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel Cty., Aug. 10, 1988) (unpublished
County Court opinion); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981); Martin
v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984).
Other jurisdictions, however, have declined to adopt this new exception. See, eg., Dayton v. Peck,
Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690 (1st Cir. 1988) (Massachusetts law); Page v. Gulf Oil Co., 812
F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1987) (Louisiana law); Everest v. American Transp. Corp., 685 F. Supp. 203 (D.
Minn. 1988); Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So.2d 781 (Ala. 1979); Bernard v. Kee Mfg.
Co., 394 So.2d 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Domine v. Fulton Iron Works, 76 Ill. App. 3d 253,
395 N.E.2d 19 (1979); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 (Kan. App. 1984); Jones v.
Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Simoneau v. South Bend Lathe, Inc.,
543 A.2d 407 (N.H. 1988); Downtowner, Inc. v. Acremental Prods., Inc., 347 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.
1984); Hamaker v. Kenwell-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 (S.D. 1986); Griggs v. Capitol
Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Ct. App.), aff'd, 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985); Ostrowski
v. Hydra-Tool Corp., 144 Vt. 305, 479 A.2d 126 (1984); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d
293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985).
As is the case with many other judicially improvised solutions to perceived social ills, the product
line expansion of successor liability proceeds on faulty premises. Particularly troublesome is the
assumption that the successor enjoys the predecessor's good will without bearing any correlative
burdens of liability. It is noted that if the predecessor indeed enjoyed good will, it was included in
the purchase price and that any resulting windfall accrues to the seller. See Aylward & Aylward,
Successor Liability for Defective Products-Misplaced Responsibility, 13 STETSON L. REV. 555, 580-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Prior to the establishment of these new approaches to successor liabil-
ity, a products liability plaintiff generally was limited to suit against the
manufacturer, the stockholders and/or other parties in the chain of prod-
uct distribution. Application of the continuing enterprise and product
line exceptions has successfully broadened the cast of potential defend-
ants in many products liability cases. Indeed, one commentator has
characterized the altered doctrine as providing an injured party "with an
unwarranted windfall of additional defendants," engendering costly liti-
gation.'1 With the additional defendants have come some intriguing out-
comes. Several cases have found successor liability on the part of
"intermediate successor" corporations that acquired a predecessor manu-
facturer's assets subsequent to the production of the injury causing prod-
uct, but sold the assets to yet another entity prior to suit.' 9 Another
court has attached responsibility for the same injury, in separate lawsuits,
to both an intermediate and an ultimate successor corporation,20 In addi-
tion, a successor has been assigned liability even though the predecessor
remained extant.21 The product line net has also snared a manufacturer
that did not even produce the specific product once produced by its pred-
ecessor.22 Finally, it appears that a purchaser of assets at a bankruptcy
sale may be deemed to be a successor for purposes of products liability
claims.23
81 (1984). In addition, the argument that the successor corporation is best situated to spread the
risk has been criticized as equating liability with ability to pay. See Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Corp., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E.2d 1145, 1108 (1982).
18. Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Seller's Products Liability in Asset Acquisitions, 10 U. TOL.
L. REV. 1, 18 (1978).
19. Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Nieves v. Bruno Sherman
Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981).
20. Trimper v. Harris Corp., 441 F. Supp. 346 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman,
436 F. Supp. 349 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
21. Amader v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Tift v. Forage
King Indus., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 77, 322 N.W.2d 14, 16 (1982) ("logic does not lead to the conclusion
that, because [the predecessor] is a proper defendant, his successor business organizations cannot be
also"). The Tft1 decision has been cited as containing an "egregious lapse of logic." Green, supra
note 7, at 46 n.129 (1986).
The Michigan courts do not require dissolution of the predecessor as a precondition to suit against
the successor. Trimper, 436 F. Supp. at 351.
22. Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 97 Cal. App. 3d 890, 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1979) (successor
held liable even though injuring product-kelp drier-was made by predecessor to fill special order
and no evidence existed that similar product ever made for others).
23. In re Matter of Mooney Aircraft, Inc., 730 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1984) (where bankruptcy
court order mandated asset sale free and clear of all claims and liabilities, injunction to protect this
order could not bar products liability claims arising after sale).
[Vol. 67:353
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II. DETRIMENTAL ASPECTS OF EXPANDED SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
The broadening of successor liability to embrace those purchasers of
corporate assets that, in some sense, "continue" a preceding enterprise or
product line poses financial problems for potential corporate defendants
and doctrinal problems for those seeking to advance the goals of corpo-
rate and products liability law.
As a matter of intellectual purity and doctrinal consistency, the exten-
sion of liability to successor corporations (other than those resulting
from mergers or consolidations) runs afoul of the central tort law re-
quirement of causation-in-fact as a prerequisite to liability. Normally,
tort liability is imposed only upon an individual or entity whose conduct
has caused injury to others.2" Yet, under expanded theories of successor
liability, the corporation whose conduct has caused injury-the original
manufacturer that placed a defective product into the stream of com-
merce-can escape liability through dissolution, leaving an otherwise
blameless successor corporation to assume its liabilities.25 Liability may
be assessed against a successor corporation for the entirely independent
acts of another.26
Many courts and commentators have noted that it is improper to im-
pose liability on an innocent successor corporation merely as a means of
providing injured claimants with some form of compensation. 27 As one
24. Under notions of strict liability, a defendant may be held liable for a plaintiff's injury,
although without fault, for having placed a defective injury-causing product in the stream of com-
merce. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). The nexus between the parties pro-
vides a foundation for application of the adage that "between two innocents, the one who caused the
harm should be liable."
25, Some argue that the ultimate burden of expanded successor liability is shifted back to the
predecessor corporation and its shareholders when the successor corporation adjusts for potential
liability by negotiating a lower price for the predecessor's assets. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
Corp., 397 Mich. 406, 428, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (1976); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J.
332, 354, 431 A.2d 811, 813 (1981). This is known as the "conduit argument." See Green, supra
note 7, at 39. This argument is unrealistic because the successor often will be unable to gauge the
size of the products liability costs associated with the seller's products. The nature of products
liability creates difficulties for the successor in calculating the amount of actual expense that it is
likely to incur. See Green, supra note 7, at 34 (acquisitions take place before the risks of a particular
product are fully appreciated); Note, The Post-Dissolution Products Liability Claim Problem: A Stat-
utory Versus a Judicial Solution, 38 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1279, 1296-297, 1307-08 (1987) (forecasting
value of future liability claims at time of acquisition not easily factored into purchase price).
26. This foils the deterrence goals of tort law, in that the manufacturer of the defective product
is not forced to bear the costs of the injuries caused by his product. See Note, Successor Corpora-
tions, supra note 2, at 701; Aylward & Aylward, supra note 17, at 579-80.
27. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1977); Travis v. Harris Corp.,
565 F.2d 443, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1977); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 619-21, 689
Washington University Open Scholarship
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court stated, "the corporate stranger which purchases some or all of the
assets of a corporation bears no closer relationship to a defective product
produced by that predecessor than does any other company in the indus-
try which is producing the same product."2 Although a successor cor-
poration is generally superior in risk-bearing or risk-spreading capacity
to an individual plaintiff, the same is also true of any other organization
of comparable size, or even the federal government.29 Adoption of liabil-
ity principles divorced from causation requirements can lead only to fur-
ther expansion of the realm of potential liabilities generally, and to a
compensation-maximizing tort system.3 °
Expanded successor liability rules also hinder the alienability of assets
by injecting a great deal of uncertainty into potential transactions. 31
Prior to the Turner32 and Ray3a decisions, the rules relating to successor
liability were clearly developed and uniformly applied, providing a mea-
sure of stability and predictability for purchasing and selling corpora-
tions. Corporate acquisition planners knew when liabilities would
transfer, and this certainty facilitated the transferability of assets, thereby
promoting business in general. 34 Today, however, while some jurisdic-
tions have expanded the scope of successor liability, others have refused
P.2d 368, 390 (Wash. 1984) (Pearson, J., dissenting); Aylward & Aylward, supra note 17, at 582;
Burns & Kohane, Liability of Successor Corporations: Altering the Suit to Add a Deep Pocket, 27 FOR
THE DEFENSE, April, 1985, at 24, 30 ("The lack of a 'deep pocket' is scarcely a principled reason to
force an innocent manufacturer to pay for another's misdeeds."); Green, supra note 7, at 21.
28. Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978) (declining to
adopt product line rule).
29. Woody, 463 F. Supp. at 820-21 ("[Mjost of the policies advanced ... in support of the rule
of expanded liability would be more efficiently advanced by placing liability on the entire industry
rather than on the good faith purchaser alone .... [The] charitable instinct is insufficient, however,
to justify holding liable a successor corporation, more or less at random, in order simply that a
wealthier party be burdened.").
30. The reader should note that courts have also imposed liability without individual findings of
causation in the so-called industry or enterprise liability cases. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). A vigorous
dissent in Sindell focused on, inter alia, the departure from causation principles. Id. at 614-15, 607
P.2d at 938-39, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146-47 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
31. See generally Note, supra note 25, at 1307-311.
32. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 307 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976). See supra
notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
33. Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d. 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977). See supra notes
11-16 and accompanying text.
34. Asset transfers are important to the health of the economy because they foster economic
efficiency and productivity. Note, supra note 25, at 1294.
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to budge from the traditional rule of nonassumption of liability." This
division among the courts creates difficulties for corporations engaging in
asset transfers. Purchasers of corporate assets are no longer certain when
they will be held responsible for the torts of their predecessors, and thus
when they should account for such liabilities in assessing an appropriate
purchase price.36 By unmanageably complicating the bargaining process
between the parties to an acquisition, expanded successor liability hin-
ders the alienability of assets. Even if a purchasing corporation assumes
that it will be held liable, accurate prediction of the magnitude of un-
known claims arising from previously manufactured products, and thus
an appropriate purchase price, poses a nearly insurmountable chal-
lenge.37 To the extent that some calculation of contingent tort liabilities
is possible, any estimation by both the buyer and seller is unlikely to yield
the same figure.38 If the parties cannot quantify contingent liabilities, an
attempted acquisition likely will fail.
Even if from this day forward products liability costs could be foreseen
and appropriately estimated by prospective buyers, no solace is forth-
coming to those corporations which purchased assets prior to the advent
of the expanded liability doctrines. Such buyers may face expenditures in
sums greater than those for which they bargained. Further, the financial
35, Green, supra note 7, at 18; Note, Recognizing Products Liability Claims At Dissolution: the
Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1048, 1054-55 n.39 (1987).
36. With the variation in law that exists from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the liability of a suc-
cessor corporation may depend upon the choice of law rules of the forum in which a plaintiff brings
suit. See, eg., Standal v. Armstrong Cork Co., 356 N.W.2d 380 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). See gener-
ally Comment, Choice-of Law in Minnesota Corporate Successor Products Liability: Which Rule Is
the "Better Rule?", 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 388-409 (1985).
37. Green, supra note 7, at 34 (assumption that successors have adequate information to make
an informed assessment of a predecessor's potential product liability is probably unjustified); Note,
Ray v, Alad Corporation: Imposing Liability on the Successor Corporation for the Defective Products
of the Predecessor Corporation, 15 CAL. W.L. REv. 338, 357-58 (1979) (the unlimited time during
which successor is liable for predecessor's products makes estimation of reduction in purchase price
for those liabilities unmanageable); Note, supra note 23, at 1308 (successor liability for contingent
products liability claims not easily factured into the price of purchased assets). Other commentators
argue that predicting and guarding against future liability is part of the regular conduct of business.
Cantu & Goldberg, Products Liability: An Argument for Product Line Liability in Texas, 19 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 621, 651 (1988). This would be true if the purchasing corporation has access to and
comprehension of information about sales history and product design comparable to that for the
purchaser's own business. This process, however, can be exceedingly complex. Green, supra note 7,
at 47; Note, supra note 25, at 1308.
38. While the seller's valuation of the costs of expected liability is necessarily limited to the
value of the seller's firm, the buyer may have more capital at risk than the seller, and thus will view
the amount of potential liability as greater. See Note, supra note 35, at 1055.
1989]
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burdens from these unanticipated liabilities likely will injure small busi-
nesses disproportionately.39
The economic harm attributable to the expansion of successor liability
is of particular significance in the mass tort context due to the magnitude
and number of the potential liabilities. For example, numerous defend-
ants have faced, under various theories, possible successor liability from
products containing asbestos.' Although the need to identify responsi-
ble defendants is great in order to address widespread societal problems
such as asbestos-related disease, the associated economic costs are equiv-
alently large.
Although the goal of the expansion of successor liability is to provide
compensation to the victims of defective products, such expansion, in
practice, does not always fulfill compensation goals. Corporations at-
tempt to, and often do, structure transactions to avoid successor
liability.41
III. PREVENTIVE MEASURES UNDER TRADITIONAL RULES
It is incumbent on business planners and counselors to consider the
implications of expanded concepts of successor liability for any contem-
plated asset acquisition. The question of whether one can acquire corpo-
rate assets without successor liability "is of crucial importance and
should be thefirst, not the last item, considered by a company before it
39. See Bernard v. Kee Mfg. Co., 409 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla. 1982) (rejecting product line
approach, citing "threat ofeconomic annihilation" of small businesses); Flaugher v. Cone Automatic
Mach. Co., 30 Ohio St. 3d 60, 507 N.E.2d 331, 337 (1987) ("potentially devastating burden on
business transfers"). See also Sell, Successor Corporation's Liability for Defective Products of Its
Transferor-The Product Line Exception, 4 J. L. & COMM. 65, 80 (1984) ("Where the [product line)
exception had not been adopted previously, its adoption initially could produce disastrous results,
particularly if the successor is a small manufacturer"); Note, Products Liability, supra note 2, at 1002
("Small corporations have limited assets and thus face possible financial destruction should the pred-
ecessor's products give rise to multiple personal injury suits.").
40. See, eg., Wall v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Tex. 1985); In
re Related Asbestos Cases, 578 F. Supp. 91 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Amader v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp.,
546 F. Supp. 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Tretter v. Rapid Am. Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1344 (E.D. Mo. 1981);
State of Maryland v. Keene Corp., Civ. Action No. 1108600 (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel Cty., Aug. 10,
1988). By recent count, over 25,000 asbestos-related cases are pending in state and federal courts.
Arness & Eliason, Insurance Coverage for "Property Damage" in Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort
Cases, 72 VA. L. REV. 943 (1986).
41. See infra, Part III, IV. See also Green, supra note 7, at 42 n. 110 (the incentive of parties to
an acquisition to exploit the inadequacies of expanded successor liability law exacerbates its lack of
comprehensiveness).
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buys or sells assets."42 The purpose of such an inquiry is not so that "the
assets of a debtor might be laundered,"4 but to ensure that the true eco-
nomic intentions of a transaction are realized.
Under the traditional corporate law principle of nonliability of succes-
sor corporations, avoidance of successor liability for products claims is
relatively easy. As discussed above, under the traditional corporate law
rule liability does not pass to a purchaser of corporate assets unless:
(1) the successor assumes liabilities through an express or implied agree-
ment; (2) the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) the
purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the transferor corpo-
ration; or (4) the transaction is fraudulently entered into to escape liabil-
ity.' To avoid successor liability, a purchaser of corporate assets need
only structure transactions to fall outside the scope of these four
exceptions.
A. Avoiding Express or Implied Agreement
In order to avoid successor liability, a purchasing corporation should
draft a purchase agreement that neither expressly nor implicitly provides
for an assumption of products liability on the part of the purchaser. This
requires careful drafting to avoid any implication of successor liability
for products claims, especially when the purchaser assumes other tort
liabilities. To ensure that courts do not interpret a purchase agreement
as including an assumption of liability, the agreement should specifically
state that product liabilities do not transfer. An express disclaimer or
exclusion of product liabilities generally will be enforced by courts. 45
Conversely, an express assumption of product-related tort liabilities in-
cluded in a purchase agreement will most certainly be viewed as grounds
42 Sheeter, Acquiring Corporate Assets Without Successor Liability: Is it a Myth?, 1986
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 137 (emphasis in original).
43. Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Credi-
tor Priorities Created By Running Covenants, Products Liability and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 127 (1987).
44. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
45. See Swayze v. A.O. Smith Corp., 694 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (enforcing express
exclusion of liability); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 438-40 (7th Cir. 1977) (enforcing
five-year limitation of liability). The existence of a disclaimer or exclusion of liability can be
trumped by a finding of continuity of product line or enterprise in jurisdictions adopting these excep-
tions, See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153 (Ist Cir. 1974) (finding successor liability on
"continuity of enterprise" theory despite presence of disclaimer).
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for imposing successor liability.46
The typical dispute arises in the context of arguably implied agree-
ments to assume liability. The existence of implied agreements arises in a
variety of circumstances. For instance, inclusion in a purchase agree-
ment of a broadly worded clause assuming certain liabilities, such as
those associated with an ongoing business, may well result in a judicial
inference that the purchaser intended to assume other related liabilities.
That is, courts may treat a transfer of several general liabilities as an
indication that the parties were impliedly including a transfer of product
liabilities as well.47 Likewise, other actions taken to suggest an assump-
tion of product liabilities, such as a purchaser's undertaking to repair or
service all products manufactured by the seller, may justify the finding of
an implied agreement.48 If, on the other hand, a purchase agreement
enumerates a list of specific debts and obligations to be assumed, a more
likely conclusion is that unenumerated liabilities were not intended to be
transferred to the purchaser.49 For instance, one court deemed an as-
sumption of "all of the obligations of the seller which exist at the closing
date" sufficient to bar assumption of future products liability claims as-
serted after the closing date. 50
Because contracts may be interpreted to include an implied assump-
tion of products liability, purchasers should fortify their immunity from
successor liability by including an express disclaimer of product liabilities
in any purchase agreement.
46. Wall v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252 (N.D. Tex. 1985); Bippus v.
Norton Co., 437 F. Supp. 104, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
47. See Bouton v. Litton Industries, Inc., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970) (finding assumption
of "all liabilities and obligations.., in respect of... all other contracts and commitments entered
into in the regular and ordinary course of [the seller's] business"' to include products liability claims
for future accidents). One commentator attributes this outcome "to the negligence of sloppy con-
tract draftsmanship." Hyman, The Liability of Successor Corporations for Defective Products of a
Predecessor Corporation-A Switch from Corporate to Tort Law," 10 S.U.L. REV. 165, 179 (1984),
48. See also supra, note 9.
49. Shane v. Hobam, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (interpreting New York law);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (interpreting California law) (agree.
ment for assumption of wage,, tax and accounts payable liabilities and absence of express agreement
concerning assumption of tort liabilities indicated intent that seller retain liabilities).
50. Grant-Howard Assocs. v. General Housewares Corp, 63 N.Y.2d 291,296-97, 472 N.E.2d 1,
3, 482 N.Y.S.2d 225, 227 (1984). See Elmer v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 698 F. Supp. 535 (D. Del.
1988) (question of fact as to which liabilities were assumed).
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B. Avoiding De Facto Merger
Where a purchase of assets amounts in practical terms and appearance
to a merger, the purchaser may be deemed to have assumed the seller's
product liabilities.5 A merger contemplates the absorption of the seller's
operations by the purchaser and the near contemporaneous dissolution of
the seller. 2 Under this view, the selling entity ceases to have an in-
dependent existence and becomes a constituent part of the acquiring
corporation.
A purchase of assets will be deemed to be a de facto merger when four
elements are present. First, there must be a continuity of the business
enterprise, with the operation utilizing essentially the same location, as-
sets, employees and management. Second, there must be a continuity of
ownership, with all or part of the purchase price being stock in the
purchasing corporation, such that the seller's shareholders become share-
holders in the acquiring corporation.53 Third, the seller must dissolve
after the sale. Fourth, the purchaser must assume those liabilities and
obligations needed for the normal ongoing operations of the business.54
Avoidance of these factors should prevent a court conclusion of a de
facto merger. Thus, a business planner contemplating a purchase of as-
sets should seek to change the management and the workforce of the
acquired enterprise, the physical location of the plant, and should keep
the portion of payment in stock as low as possible." In addition, the
51. See, eg., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800 (W.D. Mich. 1974)
(transaction was something "other than an ordinary purchase of assets").
52. Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801 ("practically contemporaneous" dissolution of seller); Ap-
plestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333 159 A.2d 146 (1960), aff'dper curiam,
33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1960); Freeman v. Hiznay, 349 Pa. 89, 36 A.2d 509 (1944). See also W.
FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7014; Note, Products Liability, supra note 2, at 1004 n.16.
53. Authority is split as to whether all of the consideration must be in stock. Cantu &
Goldberg, Products Liability, supra note 37, at 637 n.85. Compare Marks v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 232 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1986) (all stock required) with Wilson v. Fare
Well Corp., 140 N.J. Super. 476, 490-91, 356 A.2d 458, 466 (1976) (half of purchase price paid with
stock was sufficient).
54. Different courts accord primacy to different elements listed. For cases listing and applying
these considerations, see Shannon, 379 F. Supp. 797; Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press
Corp., 104 I11. App. 3d 1141, 433 N.E.2d 1104 (1982).
55. That is, the business planner should ensure that the corporations "remain strangers after
the sale." McKee v. Harris Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 565-67, 264 A.2d 98, 104 (N.J. 1970),
aff'd, 118 N.J. Super. 480, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. 1972). At least one court found the continuity
of shareholders to be the "most important requirement in finding a de facto merger." Wessinger v.
Vetter Corp., 685 F. Supp. 769, 773 (D. Kan. 1987).
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purchaser should not request or require the seller to dissolve shortly after
the transaction, but rather should encourage the seller's continued exist-
ence.5 6 Finally, a purchaser should place a strongly worded exclusion of
product liabilities in the purchase agreement. Although some courts sug-
gest that the absence of any one of the four elements creating a de facto
merger may be sufficient to defeat a contention of successor liability, 57
the test used by many courts appears to be something approaching "to-
tality of the circumstances.
5 8
C. Avoiding a 'Mere Continuation"
To prevent a transfer of liabilities, a purchasing corporation must
avoid being characterized by courts as a mere continuation of the ac-
quired corporation.59 Courts will find a mere continuation or "reincar-
nation" of an asset-selling corporation, sufficient to warrant imposition of
successor liability, where there is such a continuity of ownership and
control between the seller and purchaser as to demonstrate that the asset
sale constitutes a device for the seller to continue existence with a "new
hat."60 The focus of this inquiry is on continuation vel non of the corpo-
rate entity.61 Where a corporation is essentially continuing its preexist-
56. "[A] clever businessman can limit the chance that a product liability plaintiff will recover
against the successor corporation by making certain that the selling corporation does not dissolve
quickly." Hyman, Liability of Successor Corporations, supra note 47, at 175-76. See also Note, Prod-
ucts Liability, supra note 2, at 1009.
57. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d at 439 (no finding of de facto merger where
payment was not in stock). See also Phillips, Product Line Continuity, supra note 1, at 912 (require-
ment of stocldolder continuity is consistently deemed an essential element of de facto merger in
corporate law). The absence of payment in stock, however, is the cornerstone of the expansion of
successor liability marked by the "continuation of enterprise" theory.
58. See, eg., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974) (court seeks to
avoid "a mere procrustean application of formalities"); Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F.
Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976) ("[N]ot all of these factors are needed to demonstrate a merger; rather,
these factors are only indicators that tend to show a de facto merger").
59. See generally Note, supra note 2, at 1009-11.
60. Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp, 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1201-202 (E.D, Wis. 1979).
See also 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, § 7205 (such continuation may occur where there is but one
corporation which merely changes its form and ceases to exist upon the creation of the new corpora-
tion which is its successor).
61. Recall that the "continuity of enterprise" exception, where adopted, focuses on continuity
of the business operations, not necessarily on the ownership and control. Although the "mere con-
tinuation" exception overlaps substantially with the de facto merger exception, the former does not
require the exchange of assets for stock and often refers to a reorganization of the original corpora-
tion under federal bankruptcy law or state equivalents. Everest v. American Transp. Corp., 685 F.
Supp. 203, 206 (D. Minn. 1988). One court found that a corporation can be the "mere continua-
tion" of a noncorporate organization, in this case a sole proprietorship, while a de facto merger
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ing business under a different name, the law considers it appropriate to
charge the successor with the liabilities of the predecessor.62
Like the de facto merger exception, the mere continuation approach
seeks to elevate the substance of an asset transfer over its legal form.
Salient factors demonstrating a mere continuation are: common identity
of officers, directors and stockholders; use of the same or similar name,
location and employees; the adequacy of the consideration for the sale;
and the dissolution of the seller contemporaneous with the transaction.63
The key to preventing the imposition of successor liability on a "mere
continuation" theory is straightforward: the two entities involved need
to appear as dissimilar in structure as possible. The conclusion that plan-
ners should seek to avoid is that the two business organizations are, in
fact, the same one. The asset purchase should be at arms length, and
preferably made with cash rather than stock. The officers, directors and
shareholders of the seller should not become those of the purchaser. 64
To the extent practicable, the name of the products manufactured should
be changed.
D. Avoiding a Fraudulent Transfer
Under the traditional rule of successor nonliability, liability may be
imposed on a successor corporation when the transaction is made for the
purpose of defrauding creditors or when some elements of a good faith
purchase are lacking.65 Standards for determining whether a particular
transaction is fraudulent are contained in the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
presumably requires the participation of two corporations. Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108
Wis. 2d 72, 322 N.W.2d 14 (1982).
62. See Wallace v. Dorsey Trailers Southeast, Inc., 849 F.2d 341, 343 (8th Cir. 1988) (successor
must be created for the purpose of acquiring the predecessor's product line to be liable under the
"mere continuation" theory).
63. See Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1986); Tucker v. Paxson
Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1981); Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.
Iowa 1983); Stratton v. Garvey Int'l, Inc., 9 Kan. App. 2d 254, 266-67, 676 P.2d 1290, 1299 (1984).
See also Cantu & Goldberg, supra note 37, at 631-32.
64. This is perhaps the most significant factor under the "mere continuation" exception. See
Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977); Parson v. Roper Whitney, Inc., 586 F. Supp.
1447 (W.D. Wis. 1984); Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 860 (S.D. Iowa 1983). But see
Western Washington Laborers-Employers Health & See. Trust Fund. v. Harold Jordan Co., 760
P.2d 382, 387 (Wash. App. 1988) (no successor liability under "mere continuation" exception, de-
spite total identity of officers, directors and stockholders because consideration was adequate);
George v. Parke-Davis, 684 F. Supp. 249, 254-55 (E.D. Wash. 1988) (the identity of two minority
stockholders and the corporate treasurer insufficient to yield conclusion of "mere continuation").
65. See, e.g., Dominc v. Fulton Iron Works, 37 Il. App. 3d 253, 395 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App.
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veyance Act, enacted by a majority of states. Under the Act, a convey-
ance by an insolvent corporation for less than fair consideration is
fraudulent, as is a conveyance with actual intent to defraud present or
future creditors.66
Cases addressing this exception are rare and, in the products liability
context, generally unfavorable to plaintiffs. 67 Fraudulent transfers gener-
ally are of concern to existing commercial creditors. In addition, the
evidentiary problems facing tort plaintiffs in demonstrating a fraudulent
transfer are severe.
Avoidance of successor liability under this exception is not difficult.
Liability for a fraudulent transfer will not attach inadvertently; the req-
uisite intent to defraud creditors must accompany the transaction. Par-
ties to a transaction can reasonably assume that, absent an intent to
defraud the predecessor corporation, a court will not impose successor
liability under this exception.
IV. PREVENTIVE MEASURES UNDER THE NEW EXCEPTIONS
Avoiding successor liability is more complex in those jurisdictions that
have adopted or potentially may adopt the "product line" or "continuity
of enterprise" exceptions to the traditional rule of nonliability. Unlike
the four exceptions to the nonliability rule mentioned above which can be
sidestepped with little damage to a proposed transaction, the new excep-
tions are difficult to evade without disturbing the motivations for an asset
purchase. A purchaser seeking to acquire assets that have value as an
operational, productive whole must recognize that the more of a "prod-
uct" or "enterprise" it seeks to acquire, the more likely it is to acquire the
associated product liabilities from the seller. A piecemeal asset purchase
is far less likely to result in the attachment of liability, but such a transac-
tion in most cases will have substantially diluted benefits.68
1979); Hernandez v. Johnson Press Corp., 70 Ill. App. 3d 664, 388 N.E.2d 778 (1979); Pierce v.
Riverside Mortgage Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 77 P.2d 226 (1938).
66. UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 7, 7A U.LA. 474, 509 (1988).
67. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.D.C. 1968) (finding suffi-
cient consideration and no fraud); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal, App. 3d 767, 781, 92
Cal. Rptr. 776, 784 (1971) (no evidence of fraud); Reina v. Gingerale Corp., 472 So.2d 530 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (fraud allegation insufficient on facts). But see Economy Ref. & Serv. Co. v.
Royal Nat'l Bank, 20 Cal. App. 3d 434, 439, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710 (1971) (admission that predeces-
sor corporation received no consideration for transfer of assets to successor is sufficient to demon-
strate requisite intent to defraud).
68. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 429, 244 N.W.2d 873, 883 (1976).
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Express agreements excluding products liability may be effective to
funnel any liabilities back to the seller, but will be insufficient to defeat
claims by a plantiff espousing a product line or continuity of enterprise
theory.69 Similarly, a successor corporation demonstrating lack of iden-
tity of ownership will leave a court nonplussed. What is a purchaser to
do?
The court introducing the "continuity of enterprise" exception pro-
vided the following advice to purchasers:
It is clear that once corporations considering such transactions become
aware of the possibility of successor products liability, they can make suita-
ble preparations. Whether this takes the form of products liability insur-
ance, indemnification agreements or of escrow accounts, or even a
deduction from the purchase price is a matter to be considered between the
parties. Negotiation may be complex, but, with familiarity, they should be-
come a normal part of business transactions.
70
Use of deductions from the purchase price and escrow accounts to re-
flect anticipated future liabilities presents numerous practical problems.
7 1
Leaving aside the problems associated with prediction, valuation and ap-
propriate discounting of future claims, no allowance can be made for
unknown, delayed manifestation, or "long-tail" product claims. Again,
indemnification agreements are of limited utility after the dissolution of
the seller.
Courts often refer to the availability of products liability insurance as a
ground for their decisions imposing strict tort and successor liability on
manufacturers. 72 This insurance presumably forms the basis of judicial
faith in the superior risk-spreading capacity of the responsible defend-
ants. 3 Although the purchase of proper insurance may provide a limited
69. Nevertheless, an exclusion of product liabilities and an indemnification provision should be
included in all purchase agreements. Obviously, the value of an indemnity agreement diminishes
rapidly upon the seller's extinction. See id. at 419, 244 N.W.2d at 879 ("Once the deal is made and
the transferor corporation is extinguished, the transferee has nowhere to go for relief.").
70. Id. at 428, 244 N.W.2d at 883.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
72. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad, 19 Cal.
3d 22, 33, 560 P.2d 3, 10, 136 Cal Rptr. 574, 581 (1977). See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
25 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
73. See Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3d Cir- 1974) (noting impor-
tance of insurance in performing loss spreading function), cert denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). But see
Tift v. Forage King Indus., Inc., 108 Wis. 2d 72, 94, 322 N.W.2d 14, 26 (1982) (Callow, J., dissent-
ing) (insurance covering injuries caused by predecessor's product difficult to obtain and expensive);
Note, supra note 25, at 1310 (many manufacturers unable to obtain liability insurance).
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resource for future claimants, 74 courts have not undertaken to expound
an analysis of the responsibilities for and consequences of purchasing or
not purchasing adequate insurance.
V. NEED FOR STATUTORY REFORM
Regardless of the efficacy of any of the prescriptive measures identified
above for warding off successor liability, the fact remains that the appli-
cation of these measures has associated costs. For example, it is not al-
ways economically efficient for purchasing corporations to change the
management, personnel, and business operations of companies they ac-
quire. Such actions strategically avoid any continuity of enterprise be-
tween purchasers and sellers, but thereby eliminate the benefits that a
successor corporation might gain from the structure and stability of a
predecessor's business operations. With the advent of expanded succes-
sor liability, at least one observer has recommended that purchasers ac-
quire corporate assets on a piecemeal basis in order to ensure the
continued existence of the selling corporation.75 This recommendation
complicates the acquisition process by encouraging purchasers to shop in
several places for the necessities of production, and by pressuring corpo-
rations to sell only a portion of their assets when it may not be in their
best interest to do so.
76
Use of preventative measures also cannot impose order upon a system
that is hallmarked by uncertainty. Regardless of the number of measures
that a corporation may take to avoid successor liability, those measures
do not make it any easier for the corporation to predict where and when
it may be held liable for the torts of a predecessor. Different rules of
successor liability are applied in different jurisdictions, creating an uncer-
tainty and fear among corporations that, in turn, discourages corporate
acquisitions, and causes the economy to suffer.
In light of the problems and inefficiencies created by the judicial ex-
pansion of successor liability and the resulting measures taken by persons
to prevent such liability, a legislative solution is needed that will add
predictability to the law of successor liability and protect purchasing cor-
porations from unearned liabilities, while also advancing the compensa-
74. Among the issues affecting the adequacy or utility of insurance coverage are the nature of
the insuring agreement ("occurrence" basis or "claims made" basis), the description of the named
insured, the policy duration and the premium.
75. See Note, Products Liability, supra note 2, at 1008-09, 1017-018.
76. See id. at 1009.
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tion needs of product liability claimants. Several statutory solutions have
already been proposed that seek to protect the interests of postdissolution
products liability claimants, while advancing the goals of corporate and
products liability law.7 7
The authors of this Article propose the enactment of a statute which
would provide purchasing corporations with a predictable means of es-
caping successor liability. Under this statute, a purchaser may obtain im-
munity from successor liability merely by arranging to have future
product liabilities allocated to the seller. That is, in advance of an acqui-
sition, the seller must formally agree to assume responsibility for future
claims arising from products that it manufactured prior to the acquisi-
tion, and it must make adequate financial provisions for those claims. If
the seller refuses to purchase liability insurance or establish some other
mechanism by which to pay for future products liability claims, then the
purchaser may become subject to successor liability if it would otherwise
have been exposed under the circumstances.
Such a statute might read as follows:
TRANSFER OF ASSETS AND SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
A. Definitions
(1) "Product" means any object, substance, mixture, raw material, or
mineral that:
(a) has intrinsic economic value;
(b) is capable of delivery itself or as a component part or ingredi-
ent; and
(c) is produced for distribution in trade or commerce.
(2) "Manufacturing" means engaging in business to produce, make,
create, construct, assemble, or fabricate any product or component part
of a product. The term also includes the remanufacturing of any existing
product or component part of an existing product.
(3) "Future Products Liability Claim" means any claim for damages
arising out of the manufacture, sale, or lease of a product by a corpora-
tion that is based at least in part on events occurring after the effective
date of the asset transfer.
B. A corporation that acquires the assets of another corporation shall
77. See, e.g., Green, supra note 7 (proposing a statutory solution that would restrict a corpora-
tion's right to dissolve and distribute its assets to shareholders until the corporation has made ade-
quate provision for future liabilities); Note, Post-Dissolution, supra note 25 (advocating lengthening
the five-year "survival of remedy" period currently provided for in § 14.07 of the Revised Model
Business Corporation Act which makes dissolved corporations amenable to suit for up to five years
after publication of dissolution notice).
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not be held liable for products liability claims relating to products manu-
factured or sold by the selling corporation prior to the acquisition, if the
selling corporation has assumed responsibility for and made adequate
provision for future products liability claims.
(1) Provision for future products liability claims may be made by:
(a) obtaining liability insurance for future products liability
claims;7 8 or
(b) arranging for any other method that provides adequate protec-
tion for those asserting future products liability claims including,
but not limited to, establishing an escrow account or trust fund for
future claims.
(2) Provision for future products liability claims shall be adequate if the
amount of insurance coverage or other assets available to satisfy future
products liability claims is not less than the selling corporation's net current
value.7 9
C. At the time of an acquisition of corporate assets, included among
the records formally filed with the [Secretary of State/Officer of Corpora-
tions] shall be a document stating:
(1) the name and address of any entity that, by insurance or otherwise,
has agreed to assume any future products liability claims; and
(2) a description of the manner in which the assuming entity has made
adequate provision for future products liability claims.
Enactment of this proposed statute would encourage asset purchasers
and sellers to allocate liabilities prior to the completion of an acquisition.
The statute would thus serve to add stability and certainty to the acquisi-
tion process and would promote the transferability of assets. In addition,
the statute would induce purchasing corporations seeking immunity
78. Once the selling corporation has dissolved, it is not clear how a products liability claimant
could gain access to this insurance. State dissolution statutes might be amended to permit suit
against corporations that have dissolved, enabling future claimants to recover insurance of this type.
Alternatively, the purchasing corporation might obtain an assignment of the seller's rights under the
insurance policy or be named an additional insured. See Note, Purchase ofAssets and Successor
Liability: A Necessarily Arbitrary Limit, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 791, 816 (1986).
79. Alternatively, the statute could require that the amount of insurance coverage or other
assets made available be sufficient to cover reasonably expected future liabilities. Under this alterna-
tive, the selling corporation would have to purchase insurance with a policy limit based on the
amount of future liability reasonably anticipated at the time of the transaction. An objective assess-
ment could be assured by requiring independent appraisal by a qualified actuary.
Under either alternative, claimants still bear the risk that future liabilities will exceed the amount
of money reserved or insurance purchased to satisfy future liability claims. One commentator has
suggested that a public sector insurance institution could help redistribute consumer losses in excess
of policy limits or reserves. See Note, supra note 31, at 1071-72.
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from successor liability to find sellers willing to assume responsibility for
future products liabilities. When liabilities are allocated to sellers under
the statute, both purchasers and future claimants are better protected in
that purchasers avoid successor liability for product claims which they
had no part in creating, and claimants are ensured some form of compen-
sation for their injuries. In this way, the statute also protects the rights
of putative creditors of the selling corporation. 80
VI. CONCLUSION
The rapid emergence of products liability has created a class of prod-
ucts liability claimants seeking redress from successor corporations.
Courts have responded differently to these claimants. Some have ex-
panded the scope of the successor liability doctrine in order to provide an
avenue of compensation for these claimants, while others have refused to
budge from the traditional rule that successors generally are not respon-
sible for the debts and liabilities of predecessor corporations. The ad hoe
decisions of courts have been neither consistent nor satisfactory.
For potential purchasers, the current state of the law is very dis-
turbing. Under expanded rules of successor liability, purchasing corpo-
rations may be held liable for injuries they did not cause. In addition,
due to the division among the courts on this issue, there is no way for a
purchaser to foresee when it should account for successor liability in as-
sessing an appropriate purchase price. In light of this situation, it is par-
ticulary important for purchasers to take preventative measures to avoid
successor liability when taking part in an acquisition.
Enactment of a statute such as that proposed in this Article would
help to remove uncertainty from the corporate acquisition process, en-
80. Product liability claimants are long-tail creditors of the selling corporation who, because
their claims often accrue after the seller's demise, have not been afforded the same protection that
traditional corporate law has provided other creditors. See Green, supra note 7, at 20.
The idea of looking to a third-party purchaser or acquiror of assets to help protect the rights of
creditors is not a novel one. Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, protects
commercial creditors by requiring that prior to any bulk transfer of a merchant's inventory the
purchaser of the inventory must give notice of the transfer to the merchant's creditors. U.C.C. §§ 6-
101 to 6-111, 2A U.L.A. 281-331 (1988). This requirement of advance notice is meant to prevent a
merchant who owes debts to his creditors from selling his stock in trade, pocketing the money, and
disappearing. U.C.C. § 6-101 comments 2, 4, 2A U.L.A. 281-82 (1988). If a purchaser does not
comply with these bulk transfer requirements, then the transfer of the inventory is deemed to be
"ineffective" and creditors of the merchant have the right to either levy, attach or garnish the goods
in the purchaser's possession. U.C.C. § 6-104 comment 2, 2A U.L.A. 304 (1988).
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hance the alienability of assets, and, at the same time, preserve a viable
remedy for injured product liability claimants.
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